Who checked, and what they checked.
Four independent authorities have reviewed Haven. They are not one badge and they do not mean the same thing — each gates something specific, and none of them is an endorsement of the product. This page says exactly what each one covers, how to verify it without taking Haven’s word for it, and what nobody has certified.
A platform review is a floor, not a verdict. Passing Google’s OAuth review means Google accepted that Haven’s requested access matches what it does with it. Passing Apple’s notarization means Apple scanned the binary and found no known malware. Neither means Apple or Google has assessed whether Haven is any good, and neither of them endorses it.
What these reviews do establish is identity and accountability: a real legal entity, verified by four separate organisations, whose name appears on the installer signature and on the consent screen where you hand over access to your mail. That is a narrow claim. It is also the claim most worth being able to check.
Section 05 lists what has not been certified — including a SOC 2, an ISO 27001 and an independent penetration test, none of which Haven has. It is deliberately not the last section on the page.
01Why this page exists.
Haven asks for more access than almost any other consumer app: your mail, your files, your messages. The reasonable response to that request is suspicion. Haven’s answer is spread across three other pages, and this is the fourth — each one answering a different question.
| Page | The question it answers |
|---|---|
| How it works | What does Haven do with my data? |
| Transparency | What did Haven actually measure, including what it couldn’t? |
| Check a record | Is this specific document genuine? |
| Trust & certification | Who outside Haven checked, and what did they check? |
The four reviews below are run by four unrelated organisations, on four different timetables, gating four different things. Windows and macOS gate installation — whether the operating system will let the app run without a warning or a workaround. Microsoft Entra and Google gate access — whether Haven is allowed to ask for your mailbox at all, and what it’s allowed to ask for.
That distinction matters because passing one says nothing about the others. An app can be perfectly signed and still be refused access to Gmail. Presenting them as a single row of logos would obscure the only interesting part, which is what each one independently establishes.
02The four gates.
All four reviews Haven sought are cleared. As recently as June 2026, three of them were open.
Windows Authenticode
The installer carries a code-signing signature issued against an organisation-validated identity. The Windows install prompt names a publisher instead of “Unknown publisher,” and any later tampering with the file breaks the signature.
Live since 0.3.167 · Jul 2026Verified publisher
Microsoft verified the legal business profile and the ownership of havenprotect.app, then bound them to the app registration. The Outlook and OneDrive consent screen carries a verified badge and names the company, not a bare app name.
OAuth verification + CASA Tier 2
A third-party security assessment against Google’s Cloud Application Security Assessment, plus app verification. Unlocks the restricted scopes in production — gmail.modify and full drive — and removes the 100-hand-listed-test-user cap.
Developer ID + notarization
Signed with a Developer ID certificate under hardened runtime, then submitted to Apple’s notary service, which scans it and issues a ticket that is stapled to both the app and the disk image. Gatekeeper opens it with no right-click bypass.
Live since 0.3.136 · Jul 2026Windows Authenticode
Azure Trusted Signing, Authenticode over the .msi, with Microsoft having approved the organisation validation path — Haven Privacy LLC, a Wyoming LLC — rather than the personal-name individual path. Update manifests are signed from 0.3.168 onward, so the auto-updater will not install bytes the manifest doesn’t vouch for.
One honest caveat. Trusted Signing is not an EV certificate, and SmartScreen reputation accrues per publisher over download volume. Early installs may still see a SmartScreen prompt — it will name Haven Privacy LLC rather than refusing to identify the publisher, but it is not gone. Anyone telling you a code-signing certificate eliminates that prompt on day one is describing EV signing, or guessing.
Microsoft Publisher Verification
Signing an installer and being trusted by the Microsoft identity platform are unrelated reviews that happen to share a vendor. The identity one required enrolment in the Microsoft AI Cloud Partner Program, a verified legal business profile, and a verified publisher domain, all associated with the Entra app registration.
| MPN ID | 7126432 |
| Publisher display name | Haven Privacy LLC |
| Publisher domain | havenprotect.app |
| App (client) ID | 9063406e-d3f6-44cf-ac6e-f216484c7a23 — the combined Outlook + OneDrive registration |
The correct phrasing for this is “verified publisher.” It is not “Microsoft certified,” which denotes something else Haven has not done — see section 05.
Google OAuth verification and CASA Tier 2
Approved 2026-07-25 for both restricted scopes, including full drive. The assessment was carried out by TAC Security, an assessor from Google’s authorised list, against the CASA Tier 2 questionnaire and supporting evidence — data classification, deployment and key handling, third-party inventory.
Two things worth saying plainly, because both cut against the received wisdom. CASA was mandatory regardless of Drive: gmail.modify is itself a restricted scope, so “ship mail now and deal with files later” was never an available shortcut. And the assessment cost roughly $675, against the $5,000–15,000 that boutique-firm estimates had suggested. Haven publishes that figure because the inflated estimate is a meaningful barrier to small teams doing the right review.
What the review establishes is narrow and worth stating precisely: Google accepted that the access Haven requests is proportionate to what the app does, and that Haven’s handling of the resulting data matches its stated policy. It is not an audit of Haven’s detection quality, and Google does not endorse the product.
Apple Developer ID and notarization
Apple Developer Program enrolment as Haven Privacy LLC, team P54KG8W28M. The build codesigns with hardened runtime, notarizes through Apple’s notary service, and staples the resulting ticket — to the .dmg container as well as the .app inside it, because a stricter or offline Gatekeeper refuses to mount an unstapled wrapper.
One known caveat, and it isn’t a signing failure. A .dmg hand-copied to a Mac over a Windows remote-desktop session or file share gets tagged with a com.apple.quarantine attribute naming the transferring app, and macOS will refuse to run it regardless of a valid signature. Downloading it normally in a browser is unaffected. If you hit this, xattr -dr com.apple.quarantine on the app clears it — but verify the signature first, using the command in section 03, rather than reflexively stripping quarantine from anything that won’t open.
03Check it yourself.
Every claim in section 02 is verifiable from your own machine, against Apple, Microsoft and Google — not against anything Haven serves. Nothing below requires trusting this page. If a check disagrees with what you read here, the check is right; tell us.
Windows — who signed the installer
Right-click the .msi → Properties → Digital Signatures. Or, in PowerShell:
$msi = ".\Haven_0.3.201_x64_en-US.msi"
Get-AuthenticodeSignature $msi |
Format-List Status, SignerCertificate
# Status : Valid
# SignerCertificate: [Subject]
# CN=Haven Privacy LLC,
# O=Haven Privacy LLC, C=US
What matters: Status is Valid, and the subject names Haven Privacy LLC — the same entity as everywhere else on this page. NotSigned, HashMismatch, or any other organisation means you do not have a Haven build; do not install it.
macOS — signed, notarized, and stapled
Gatekeeper’s own verdict on the installed app:
spctl -a -vvv -t install /Applications/Haven.app
# /Applications/Haven.app: accepted
# source=Notarized Developer ID
# origin=Developer ID Application:
# Haven Privacy LLC (P54KG8W28M)
The signing authority chain and the team identifier:
codesign -dv --verbose=4 \
/Applications/Haven.app 2>&1 |
grep -E 'Authority|TeamIdentifier'
# Authority=Developer ID Application:
# Haven Privacy LLC (P54KG8W28M)
# Authority=Developer ID Certification Authority
# Authority=Apple Root CA
# TeamIdentifier=P54KG8W28M
And that the notarization ticket is actually attached, which is what lets it open offline:
xcrun stapler validate /Applications/Haven.app
# The validate action worked!
What matters: the team identifier is P54KG8W28M and the chain terminates at Apple Root CA. The chain is what makes this meaningful — anyone can produce a certificate that says “Haven,” but only Apple can produce one that chains to their root.
Microsoft — the verified-publisher badge
When you connect Outlook or OneDrive, the consent screen shows a verified badge beside the publisher name. This is a positive signal, and its absence is the thing to notice: an unverified app renders its name plainly, with no warning. “No warning appeared” does not distinguish the two.
The machine-readable check, if you administer a Microsoft 365 tenant, is verifiedPublisher on the service principal — non-null exactly when publisher verification holds:
GET https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/servicePrincipals
(appId='9063406e-d3f6-44cf-ac6e-f216484c7a23')
?$select=appDisplayName,verifiedPublisher
# "verifiedPublisher": {
# "displayName": "Haven Privacy LLC",
# "verifiedPublisherId": "7126432"
# }
One thing this does not prove. If you connect and see no consent screen at all, that means the grant was already cached — not that the app is trusted. Revoke the grant and reconnect if you want to see the screen.
Google — verification status on the consent screen
Google has no public API for an app’s verification state, so the check is the consent screen itself. A verified app in production shows the app name and the developer, and asks for its scopes directly.
The signal to look for is a negative one: an unverified app requesting restricted scopes shows an interstitial reading “Google hasn’t verified this app” with an Advanced link to proceed anyway. If you ever see that screen connecting Gmail or Drive to something calling itself Haven, stop — you are not on Haven’s OAuth client.
After connecting, everything Haven holds is listed at myaccount.google.com/connections, where you can revoke it in one click without going through Haven at all.
04One legal identity.
Four authorities, four reviews — but one entity underwrites all of them. Microsoft org-validated it for the installer signature and separately verified it for the consent screen; Apple enrolled it in the Developer Program; Google verified it during OAuth review.
| Legal entity | HAVEN PRIVACY LLC, a Wyoming limited liability company |
| EIN | 42-2864164 |
| Verified publisher domain | havenprotect.app |
| Apple Developer Team ID | P54KG8W28M |
| Microsoft Partner (MPN) ID | 7126432 |
| Contact for security reports | havenprotect.app/contact |
If a name other than Haven Privacy LLC appears on an installer signature, a consent screen, or an invoice claiming to be Haven, it is not Haven. That single sentence is most of what this page is for: the value of four separate identity verifications is that they converge on one name you can pattern-match against.
“Haven” is the product; Haven Privacy LLC is the company. Older copy elsewhere on this site occasionally renders the company name loosely — the legal entity is, and has only ever been, Haven Privacy LLC.
05What is not certified.
Four cleared gates is the complete list. Everything below is something Haven has not passed — some by choice, some still pending, some simply absent. They are listed here rather than omitted, because a page that only shows what went well is advertising.
SOC 2, ISO 27001, independent penetration test None held
Haven holds none of these. The only third-party security assessment it has undergone is CASA Tier 2, and that is scoped to Google’s data-safety requirements for the data Google grants access to — not to the product as a whole, and not to the desktop agent’s local behaviour.
This is a resourcing decision at pre-revenue scale, not a claim that the audits are unnecessary. It is stated the same way in the transparency report, section 08.
Microsoft 365 Certification Deliberately not pursued
Publisher Verification is tier 1 of Microsoft’s three-tier App Compliance Program. The other two are Publisher Attestation (a self-assessment questionnaire) and Microsoft 365 Certification (an annual independent audit including penetration testing — the genuine CASA analogue). Haven has done neither.
Both attach to an app published through Partner Center’s commercial marketplace. Haven ships as a directly distributed desktop client with no AppSource or Teams-store listing, so there is nothing for either tier to attach to. If Haven ever lists in that marketplace, this becomes a real gap; today it is a road not taken.
Yahoo and AOL Mail OAuth access Declined by Yahoo
Yahoo’s mail scopes require commercial access approval. Haven applied on 2026-09-14; on 2026-10-12 Yahoo replied that it will not provide OAuth access to Haven at this time, without giving a reason. Yahoo Mail and AOL Mail therefore connect with an app password you generate in your Yahoo or AOL account’s security settings — never your login password. It works only for mail, is kept in your computer’s credential store, and you can revoke it from Yahoo or AOL at any time.
Dropbox production status Deliberately deferred
The Dropbox app sits at development status, which is functionally identical to production except for a ceiling on linked users. Haven is far below it.
The production review asks whether an app requests broader permission than its functionality requires. Haven asks for files.metadata.read and never files.content.read, which is the strongest version of that argument — and it is best made once a reviewer can watch the connector work rather than read about it.
CASA recertification Date unconfirmed
CASA is not permanent. An earlier notice named 2026-10-22, and whether that date is already satisfied by the completed assessment or marks the start of the next cycle is not yet confirmed with the assessor. It is recorded here as open rather than resolved in Haven’s favour, and this page will be updated either way.
Finally, the general caveat that applies to all four cleared gates: none of them is a security warranty. Apple’s notary service scans for known malware. Microsoft’s publisher verification confirms a business identity. Google’s review checks scope proportionality and policy consistency. None of them audited Haven’s source code, and none of them is vouching for the product.
06How this page is maintained.
One rule governs this page, and it was learned the hard way.
The rule
A certification claim with no artifact behind it does not go on a public trust page. Every status in section 02 is backed by a version-controlled record — a portal screenshot, an approval mail, a certificate, a signed build — held in Haven’s repository, not in anyone’s memory.
In August 2026 this claim set briefly included a second Microsoft programme that Haven had never completed. It entered from recollection during a documentation pass — an enrolment mail was remembered as a completed audit — and it was flagged at the time as unevidenced, and published anyway. It was found and retracted a few days later, before it ever reached this site.
Two things came out of that. First, this page: the claims that were scattered across release notes and internal docs now live in one place where they can be checked against each other. Second, the rule above, which is not a sentiment. An unevidenced claim about an external authority is not a documentation gap — it is a misrepresentation of that authority, and it is worse than saying nothing.
Cadence. This page is reviewed whenever a gate’s status changes and at minimum alongside each semiannual transparency report. Status changes are dated. When something is withdrawn or expires, it is marked as such rather than quietly deleted.
If something here is wrong, out of date, or contradicted by a check you ran, say so — that is a more useful report than most.